

# FASCISM OLD AND NEW

AMERICAN POLITICS AT THE CROSSROADS

CARL BOGGS

ROUTLEDGE  


# FASCISM OLD AND NEW

Deep historical trends suggest the United States could be moving toward a distinctly novel form of fascism, embracing elements of the historical phenomenon as it appeared in such countries as Italy, Germany, Japan, and Spain while departing in significant ways. A twenty-first century fascism would hardly be revolutionary or totalitarian, as it would involve no dramatic break with the past, following a logic of continuity and building on firmaments of entrenched power going back to World War II. This new type of fascist regime would be driven by a tightening confluence of sectoral interests in American society: corporate, state, military, and cultural – interests favoring oligarchy, authoritarianism, the warfare system, and surveillance order within an expanding globalized matrix of power. The dominant historical forces emphasized by such theorists as C. Wright Mills (*The Power Elite*) and Sheldon Wolin (*Democracy, Inc.*), an important foundation of this book, have grown stronger and more pervasive across the decades. An integrated power structure has been fueled by new advances in technology, a money-saturated political system, and neoliberal globalism bolstered by the spread of rightwing populism that, among other things, has catapulted Donald Trump into the U.S. presidency.

In this book, Carl Boggs explores new political and ideological terrain in systematically considering the prospects for a gradual development of fascism in contemporary American society and, by extension, elsewhere across the advanced industrial world. He persuasively argues that modern fascistic trends, arguably most visible in the U.S., demonstrate a closer affinity with Mussolini's Italy (corporate state) than with the more extreme Nazi German model of tyranny and genocide.

A very timely scholarly enterprise, this book will be of interest to students of contemporary radical politics, fascism more broadly, U.S. political history, ideologies and party politics.

**Carl Boggs** is Professor of Social Sciences at National University in Los Angeles. After receiving his Ph.D. in political science from U.C., Berkeley, he has taught at Washington University in St. Louis, Carleton University in Ottawa, UCLA, USC, and Antioch University, Los Angeles. In 2007 he was recipient of the Charles McCoy Career Achievement Award from the American Political Science Association. While at National University he has received numerous awards, including Scholar of the Year and three Professorates for outstanding faculty contributions. He has authored more than twenty books, written more than three hundred articles and has had three radio programs at KPFK in Los Angeles. He is on the editorial board of several journals, including *Theory and Society*, where he is book-review editor, and *New Political Science*. He writes regularly for the journal *CounterPunch*, founded by Alexander Cockburn.

“Carl Boggs is one of the most brilliant political theorists writing today. *Fascism Old and New* offers a coruscating analysis of the development of the twenty-first fascism taking root in the political soil of the United States. It is a work that is both pathfinding and iconoclastic and sure to be a classic.”

**Peter McLaren**, Distinguished Professor of Critical Studies, Chapman University

“While most writers fixate on Trump and Twitter, Carl Boggs digs deep into the political and social realities of America. For Boggs, the danger of fascism is not one rogue politician, but is rooted in U.S. history and the growing combined power of corporations, the state, and militarism. Everyone concerned about the future of America, and indeed the world, needs to read this book.”

**Jerry Harris**, National Secretary of the Global Studies Association

“Carl Boggs’ *Fascism Old and New* systematically explores the defining features of the European and Japanese fascisms that emerged between the two World Wars and examines the extent to which current configurations of economic, political, military and cultural power constitute the potential for fascism in contemporary U.S. society. Boggs’ analysis suggests that highly capitalist and militarist societies like the U.S. could be susceptible to fascist trajectories and shows that fascism remains a threat in the world today.”

**Douglas Kellner**, UCLA, author of *American Nightmare: Donald Trump, Media Spectacle, and Authoritarian Populism*

“In the age of Trump, it is crucial to develop a new language, critical narrative, and understanding of politics that captures what Carl Boggs terms America’s move into a ‘fascist equivalent.’ While the term fascism has been increasingly emerging in the popular and mainstream media to address the current political and economic landscape, its use is often muddled and ahistorical. In *Fascism Old and New*, Carl Boggs has produced a brilliantly layered and comprehensive commentary on America’s slide into fascism that is historically illuminating, theoretically novel, and enormously informative in its scope and development. Not only does this book offer an important warning from history, but it also addresses what it means to think through, understand, and engage the looming threat to democracy that has emerged in the United States. Fascism for Boggs is both far from a relic of the past and a carbon copy of past fascist regimes; he explores its emergence in the United States as a culmination of a long series of economic, political, cultural forces wedded to globalization and the barbarism of a financial order that has intensified its concentration of power and influence. This is a work of superb scholarship and lyrical writing that will make the reader rethink both the importance of history, especially the defining elements of European fascism, and the relevance of their legacy for contemporary politics, while providing a new and accessible language that is at once rigorous, accessible, and illuminating. Everyone who is concerned about the legacy of fascism and how it might emerge in the United States should read this book.”

**Henry Giroux**, author of *American Nightmare: Facing the Challenge of Fascism* (2018)

# FASCISM OLD AND NEW

American Politics at the Crossroads

*Carl Boggs*

First published 2018  
by Routledge  
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge  
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

*Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business*

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*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

Names: Boggs, Carl, author.

Title: Fascism old and new : American politics at the crossroads / Carl Boggs.

Description: New York, NY : Routledge, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2017058516 (print) | LCCN 2018013494 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781351049719 (Master) | ISBN 9781351049702 (WebPDF) |

ISBN 9781351049696 (ePub) | ISBN 9781351049689 (Mobipocket/Kindle) |

ISBN 9781138485334 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781138485341

(pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781351049719 (ebk.)

Subjects: LCSH: Fascism. | Authoritarianism--United States. | Elite (Social sciences)--Political activity--United States. | Capitalism--Political aspects--United States. | United States--Political culture. | United States--Politics and government--21st century.

Classification: LCC JC481 (ebook) | LCC JC481 .B524 2018 (print) |

DDC 320.53/30973--dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2017058516>

ISBN: 978-1-138-48533-4 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-138-48534-1 (pbk)

ISBN: 978-1-351-04971-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Bembo  
by Taylor & Francis Books

**Dedicated to the legacy of Antonio Gramsci, one of the many victims of Italian fascism.**

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# PREFACE

To speak of “fascism” in American political discourse has long been one of the great taboos of political life – the wise opinion-leaders ritually insisting that this nefarious reference, like dictatorship, tyranny, and totalitarianism, is relevant exclusively to *other* countries. Further, to identify deep fascist tendencies at work in the United States, as I do in this book, will seem to many readers crazy or even perverse, a transgression of ideological limits. After all, the earlier fascist regimes of Germany, Japan, and Italy had been mortal enemies during World War II, their challenge militarily defeated and presumably confined to the historical abyss after years of costly Allied warfare. What could the U.S., widely-regarded model of Constitutional democracy, pluralism, and political liberties, have in common with those barbaric, obsolete systems?

One flaw in such conventional thinking is that, should American society indeed be moving along the road to fascism or its modern “equivalent”, that system – though replicating much of the earlier pattern – would inevitably differ from those regimes in crucial ways. The result would be a distinctly *American* fascism where established liberal-democratic institutions and norms might even survive, at least in truncated form. A twenty-first century fascism in the U.S., or any advanced industrial setting, would hardly be revolutionary, much less dictatorial or “totalitarian”; involving no dramatic break with the past, it would follow a logic of *continuity*, building on firmaments of an entrenched power structure that go back to World War II.

What a new fascism might carry forward and embody, therefore, is a tightening confluence of sectoral interests in American society: corporate, state, military, and increasingly media – interests promoting oligarchy, authoritarianism, and a warfare state within an expanding, globalized matrix of domination. While fascistic tendencies have been ignored or downplayed by mainstream social scientists,

journalists, and politicians, the nucleus of such tendencies was already identified many decades ago by sociologist C. Wright Mills, in his classic *The Power Elite*. If Mills' seminal insights have been studiously avoided or dismissed across the political culture, they have not only been validated across the expanse of many decades but have probably far exceeded Mills' own most dystopic projections. The work of recent critics like Sheldon Wolin, in *Democracy, Inc.*, has followed in the tracks of Mills, Wolin going so far as to write of an American "inverted totalitarianism" taking hold at a time when the dynamic properties of liberal democracy have withered and, for the most part, vanished.

The main historical forces emphasized by Mills and Wolin – a conceptual foundation of this book – have grown stronger in succeeding decades, after having gained postwar (and Cold War) momentum. An integrated power structure has given rise to more or less predictable outcomes: broadened corporate domination and oligopolistic markets, military-industrial complex, security-state and surveillance order, widening authoritarianism across all institutions, a money-saturated political system, propagandistic media – all bolstered within a framework of neoliberal globalization. Against this harshly undemocratic backdrop, citizen participation, popular decision-making, and institutional accountability have been reduced to a shameful charade, the celebrations of American democracy ringing more hollow with each passing year. All the prevailing, self-congratulating tropes – democracy, free markets, independent media, government hostility toward big business – appear today as outright fictions. Worse, a more concentrated and integrated power structure nowadays faces fewer obstacles as it strives for ever-greater wealth, leverage, and geopolitical advantage. In this setting impediments to any potential fascism will be correspondingly reduced.

Such a depressing trajectory gathers energy in a world of corporate-driven globalization that endows American capitalist interests (and their government and military partnerships) with new economic and political leverage. Meanwhile, U.S. pursuit of military supremacy on a world scale remains fully intact: Washington retains its sprawling empire of bases, its conventional and nuclear supremacy, its dominant presence in the Middle East, its aggressive foreign policy, and above all its Pentagon behemoth – whether the White House is occupied by Democrats or Republicans. All familiar warnings about U.S. "imperial decline" are not only premature but rest upon no compelling evidence. Even a serious decline in U.S. economic capacity would hardly mean an equivalent weakening of *military force*, which at present consumes resources nearly equal to what the next eight nations spend *combined*. Barring an unlikely overthrow of the American power structure, its mammoth warfare state and imperial presence are not about to disappear.

It is this very power structure – though on a much smaller scale – that formed the nucleus of earlier fascist regimes from the early 1920s to mid-1940s (or mid-1970s for Franco's Spain). From the first successful movement and party in Italy, to those of Germany, Japan, and Spain, essentially the same bloc of ruling forces dominated the scene: big business, authoritarian government, military apparatus – the

dynamic core of classical fascism everywhere it rose to power. There was also abundant reliance on traditional sources of power – Church, big landowners, monarchy – sources not available (or needed) in an era of highly-rationalized state-capitalism. As for the “dynamic core” of fascism, that would be nowadays qualitatively stronger, surely more developed and technologized than was true of Nazi Germany or fascist Italy, for example. The American warfare state alone dwarfs anything that Hitler, Mussolini, or the Japanese elites could have imagined.

At the same time, important trappings of interwar fascism are strikingly absent from the American (or European) context: leadership cult, single-party monopoly, paramilitary squads, symbolic features (uniforms, marches, etc.), massive state propaganda. Further lacking is something resembling a coherent fascist ideology – for example, Mussolini’s concept of the “corporate state” or Adolf Hitler’s new Reich embellished by a strident ultra-nationalism (also a vital component of interwar fascism). Some or all of these elements could appear in the U.S. at some future juncture, but in reality few if any of these will be *necessary* – at least in their classical form. Oligarchy, authoritarianism, imperial agendas, and vital propaganda functions can readily coexist with liberal-democratic institutions and practices that barely conceal an alienated and depoliticized mass population. Here cults, uniforms, songs, marches, and local squads could turn out to be rather superfluous, even counter-productive to the most important elite agendas. This could eventually equate to an entirely novel form of fascism – one that borrows from the past while moving along its own (modern) trajectory.

If talk of a potential American fascism seems rather outlandish, as it has in mainstream political culture, it actually rests on careful analysis of domestic and global at work in the society since perhaps World War II, if not earlier. Many such tendencies – the elevated role of Wall Street, rising workplace repression, militarization of society, increasing civic violence, surveillance order, widening gulf between rich and poor, growth of reactionary populism, and spread of a propagandistic media culture – are now taken for granted by the mass population. Anti-war protests, for example, have become increasingly rare and sporadic. Other social movements – often lively and with broad support – generally decline and then disintegrate; their historical durability and political definition has always been a troublesome question. In a setting where Americans have mostly grown accustomed to the repressive and destructive features of authoritarian power, fascistic developments can stealthily build and gain resonance, with critical dissent and political opposition either feeble or absent. The power structure has become so institutionalized as to be nearly invisible, its expansion appearing virtually seamless, scarcely a cause for moral or ideological panic.

Taking such factors into account, my argument here is that if the current trajectory continues into the near future – as is likely – a fascistic outcome of some type will be difficult to avoid. This will have less to do with individual politicians and their evil schemes than with far-reaching *historical trends* long

present in American society. Such trends could be accelerated by severe crisis: war, economic collapse, terrorist attacks, international episodes. No upheavals, revolutions, palace coups, paramilitary upsurges, or even tyrannical leaders will likely be needed. At this juncture (November 2017) it is worth noting that the 2016 ascendancy of Donald Trump to the White House does *not* occur to the author as a specifically fascist moment in U.S. history, contrary to what is commonly heard in liberal and progressive circles. To be sure, Trump *does* possess strong elements of a leadership cult, replete with narcissism and grandiose visions (“making American great again”). Yet he is the ultimate billionaire capitalist whose outlook and policies favor extreme corporate and banking priorities, combined with his own brand of ultra-nationalism, without however moving to any understanding of fascism. For that reason I have chosen to view Trump as representing an *interregnum* between existing power arrangements – that is, a militarized state-capitalism – and potential American fascism. Although many people, alarmed by what the new president seems capable of doing, have been hoping for a book on Trump the unapologetic fascist, the new incarnation of Mussolini, this is emphatically not that book, as I argue more fully in the second postscript.

When the topic of fascism arises in American political and media discourse, attention reflexively goes toward Nazi Germany – the most extreme case, marked by the most tyrannical power structure, death camps, and holocaust, with its extraordinary record of death and destruction. This is a rather worthless template for contemporary analysis, however, especially given that other fascist systems of the period fell considerably short of the Nazi extreme. The fortunate reality is that any conceivable fascism of the future is highly unlikely to match (or even approach) the Nazi example, the regime itself having been so barbaric as to belie even the remotest attraction for either mass populations or elites. To judge present-day fascistic tendencies against such a nightmarish backdrop makes little sense.

It follows that any current fascist trajectory – in the U.S. above all – will more closely approximate the original Italian model, where the Mussolini regime moved to integrate the big-business, government, and military sectors, but never came close to the German legacy of tyranny, warfare, and genocide. As noted, Italian fascism depended heavily on its alliance with traditional social forces (including the Church and nobility), but such an alliance would be neither desirable nor possible under conditions of advanced state-capitalism – though the role of reactionary populism, with its strong evangelical base, should not be understated.

A word here about “totalitarianism”. I have consciously avoided use of the term in this book, except to point out its uselessness as a conceptual tool for understanding historical fascism, other authoritarian regimes, or contemporary power structures. Interwar regimes in Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain were never absolute or monolithic: those societies retained abundant diversity,

pluralism, and social autonomy, as the state more accurately *coexisted* with such powerful interests as big business, big landowners, the Church, and the military. “Totalitarianism” is better seen today as a starkly Cold-War construct that pitted (good) “democracies” against (evil) “totalitarians” as in Nazi Germany, Stalinist Soviet Union, and other Communist systems. Long ago discredited for its exaggerated ideological bias, the concept should nowadays yield to more accurate terms such as “authoritarianism” – a less absolutist, less moralistic frame of reference.

This work is partly the culmination of numerous books and articles I have written across the past two decades, geared to understanding the American power structure and particularly the warfare state. A guiding motif has been the continuous, seemingly unimpeded, expansion of corporate, state, military, and (more recently) media power in the U.S., to the point where the labyrinthine apparatus of militarized state-capitalism now appears well along the path to a distinctly modern variant of fascism. These books include *Imperial Delusions*, *Empire versus Democracy*, *Phantom Democracy*, *The Hollywood War Machine* (with Tom Pollard), and *Origins of the Warfare State*. My research and writing has revolved around the largest (and probably most dangerous) ruling apparatus the world has ever seen. Along this winding route of discovery I have incurred a great debt to the seminal influences of Chalmers Johnson and Sheldon Wolin, both crucial to my intellectual and political growth during graduate student years in the political science department at the University of California, Berkeley – and later. I owe a further special debt to three long-time colleagues and friends, Ray Pratt, Tom Pollard and Peter McLaren, who for many years have had unbounded (hopefully not *unfounded!*) belief in my work. Finally, my greatest debt is to Laurie Nalepa for her unwavering support and inspiration.

Carl Boggs  
Los Angeles, California  
November, 2017

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# INTRODUCTION

In this book I argue that the United States, the most exemplary liberal democracy in the world in terms of reputation, is well along the path to a new type of fascism, or what might be called a “fascist equivalent” – ruled by a modern power structure that is increasingly oligarchical and authoritarian, not only politically but economically and culturally. This view of contemporary American politics will bring shock to those happy with more flattering images of a system long regarded as a model of constitutional democracy, social diversity, ideological tolerance, and benevolent foreign policies. Americans are generally inclined to embrace a civics-textbook version of U.S. history even as that version is daily contradicted by harsh domestic and global realities. At the same time, Americans have been conditioned to see “fascism” (more specifically, German Nazism) as a monstrous evil brought into the world by mysterious, diabolical forces looking to enslave the planet. The graphic and enduring Nazi image conveys a system maintained by crude state propaganda, a maniacal dictator (Adolph Hitler), brutal war machine, network of death camps, and genocidal politics. The idea that some *other* model of fascism – the Italian, for example – might have greater relevance to present-day conditions is scarcely entertained. Nor is the possibility of an entirely novel type of fascism that might ultimately coexist with the surface institutions and practices of liberal (corporate) capitalism.

The conventional approach to fascism, set forth in novels, movies, and standard historical accounts, has given rise not only to a caricature of historical movements, parties, and regimes labeled “fascist”, but to a reluctance to consider deep fascistic tendencies already at work in a supposed model of democracy like the U.S. Longstanding myths hinder the capacity to analyze an existing constellation of political forces and social conditions that, in the author’s view, suggest a dystopic future for American society as we move with growing uncertainty into the third decade of the twenty-first century.



## 2 Introduction

One useful point of departure is to view U.S. development through a merger of historical forces that seem to be gaining momentum: corporatism, super-patriotism, militarism, imperialism, racism. A pressing question here is: could such development – that is, expansion of proto-fascist tendencies on the path to a more full-blown fascist order – eventually prevail within a framework of pluralist-democratic politics? My perspective here is that such an outcome must be taken more seriously than it has at a time when those tendencies are already well advanced. The idea that fascism might appear in new guise, moving along a different road to power, has been entertained by various commentators since at least the late 1940s, mostly in Europe. Writing in *Brave New World Revisited* (1958), Aldous Huxley famously commented:

By means of ever more effective methods of mind manipulation, the democracies will change their nature; the quaint old forms – elections, parliaments, Supreme Courts, and all the rest – will remain. The underlying substance will be a new kind of non-violent totalitarianism ... the ruling oligarchy and its highly-trained elite of soldiers, policemen, thought manufacturers, and mind manipulators will quietly run the show as they see fit.<sup>1</sup>

Leaving aside whether this type of system could ever be “nonviolent” or “totalitarian”, or even “quiet”, Huxley’s famous projection seems uncomfortably close to the target.

The appearance of an oligarchical and authoritarian power structure in the U.S. was first recognized at the very time Huxley penned his statement – by C. Wright Mills in *The Power Elite* (1956), where he explores the rapid growth of a freewheeling corporate sector within a confluence of state, business, and military interests that, according to Mills, was already subverting liberal-democratic institutions entirely *from within*.<sup>2</sup> While hardly “totalitarian” in any strict sense, American politics had by the mid-1950s begun to enter something of a fascistic trajectory, veering closer to earlier fascist regimes than Americans (of whatever ideological stripe) were prepared to acknowledge; few would deny that their nation was still a beacon of democracy. As the postwar system achieved permanence, it took on anti-democratic characteristics beneath an exterior of party competition, open elections, pluralism, and Constitutional freedoms, lapsing into a process of institutional and ideological decline.

The rise of a distinctly American fascism could follow the above pattern – both at the summits of power and within mass society. What Mills found during the 1950s has surely expanded and deepened since: state, corporate, and military power has become more concentrated and integrated, the big-business and banking sectors impacting all realms of American society, beginning with government, where Congress, the White House, state legislatures, federal agencies, parties, and elections have been colonized and reshaped by stupendous networks of wealth. Corporate interests were able to decisively influence policies, laws, and public

opinion through a complex matrix of lobbies, think tanks, PACs (political action committees), and the media. In *The Wrecking Crew* (2008), Thomas Frank surveyed the role of well-funded lobbies and other elite-supported groups as they set out to take over governmental power and direct it overwhelmingly toward big-business agendas – a motif explored further by such critics as Chris Hedges and Sheldon Wolin.<sup>3</sup>

With the so-called Reagan Revolution and widening scope of conservative ideology, corporate interests have been able to further penetrate federal and state governments hoping to impede the public capacity to serve broad constituencies. This “wrecking crew”, operating under the pretense of laissez-faire principles (“free markets”), has carried out a sharpening assault on liberal politics and the associated New Deal legacy – but emphatically not on “big government”. Conservatives like to frame state power as innately coercive and oppressive, a structure logically opposed to the ideals of freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity. As Frank makes clear, however, this archaic ideology is nothing but a pseudo libertarianism, cover for unregulated (or poorly-regulated) business and banking interests, the authoritarian and plutocratic elements of which are never acknowledged. Propagating the myth of “small government”, these groups in fact coexist rather comfortably with the real functions of *big* government: the military, law enforcement, intelligence, institutional as well as material supports for the industrial and financial sectors. Such ersatz libertarianism makes perfectly good sense, however, as that is the linchpin of conservatives’ (often-successful) efforts to mobilize poor and working people around policies that starkly conflict with their own pressing interests. It is how they win elections.

Frank’s *What’s the Matter With Kansas?* (2005) addresses this same phenomenon: how Republicans gain electoral success by appealing to the poor and disadvantaged through assorted “moral” concerns: guns, immigration, foreign threats, gay sexuality, abortion, “family values”. Those driven to anger over such emotionally-charged issues, and feeling hostile toward elites or the “establishment”, are often drawn into a shrill, talk-radio-style conservatism that pits ordinary people against “arrogant elites” in highly-educated, liberal, secular, urban populations. Republicans who advance the interests of an insular wealthy stratum rarely get elected without broadening their solicitation far beyond the rich and privileged, and this is done – as it was for earlier fascist movements – by turning to non-class appeals such as nationalism, religion, and traditional values.<sup>4</sup> This very dynamic has fed Tea-Party politics in the U.S. since 2009, a “populist” reaction to Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the White House. Here reactionary populism amounts to sheer duplicity since the “values” championed (“free markets”, traditional family lifestyles, etc.) rarely get translated into concrete policy.

In contemporary American politics, therefore, class anger is routinely turned on its head, with populism manipulated to serve profoundly conservative interests. This variant of mass mobilization comes from one of the oldest traditions, dating to the Roman Empire, when Cato the Elder championed a politics of moral

## 4 Introduction

regeneration and glorification of “the people” to bolster the status quo. Long before Mussolini and Hitler – and U.S. practitioners of reactionary populism like Huey Long, George Wallace, and Donald Trump – the poor and disenfranchised were being mobilized in defense of a variety of elite-sustaining ideologies from xenophobia to racism and militarism.<sup>5</sup> This has long been a reliable elite stratagem for neutralizing or defeating oppositional challenges. Viewed together, these historical discourses have legitimated oligarchy and authoritarianism as normalcy within American society. The question posed throughout this book is whether such seemingly irreversible trends are moving in the direction of proto-fascism, neo-fascism, or an even more fully-developed fascism. For any of these to be realized, the power structure would have to be more structurally and ideologically integrated at the summits, in which case democratic processes would ultimately be more eviscerated than is presently the case.

As I argue in the following chapters, a fascistic trajectory seems already well advanced, surely beyond what most Americans might be willing to consider. First among causes, power-elite consolidation is aided by expansion of a warfare state driven by U.S. superpower ambitions going back to World War II. It was Mills in fact who first conceptualized a new American power elite rooted in a confluence of corporate, government, and military interests, largely detached from the zone of citizen participation. Writing at a time when the warfare state had just become a “permanent” fixture of American life, Mills observed: “As the institutional means of power and the means of communication that tie them together have become steadily more efficient, those now in command of them have come into command of instruments of rule quite unsurpassed in the history of mankind.”<sup>6</sup> For Mills, anticipating an even more concentrated and unified power structure in the decades ahead, the great force of militarized state-capitalism would sooner or later clash with the requirements of democracy and “free markets”, yielding to a statist, oligarchical, authoritarian pattern of development.

This distinctly American behemoth was in great measure an outgrowth of World War II, the central motif of my book *Origins of the Warfare State* (2016).<sup>7</sup> Here, according to Mills, “the merger of the corporate economy and the military bureaucracy came into its present-day significance”,<sup>8</sup> deepening the convergence of “private” and “public” realms. The resulting erosion of democratic citizenship and institutional accountability had become, for Mills, endemic to this system. Attuned to the expansion of a war economy (military Keynesianism) and security state, Mills could write several decades ago that “... the structural clue to the power elite today lies in the enlarged and military state” where “virtually all political and economic actions are now judged in terms of military definitions of reality”,<sup>9</sup> the very phenomenon that was so crucial to the emergence of interwar fascist movements, parties, and regimes.

Managed by an imperial presidency, the warfare state has been driven by a complex ensemble of factors: superpower politics, military Keynesianism, perpetual wars, influence of corporate lobbies and think tanks, technological agendas,

postwar arms races, simple (Pentagon) bureaucratic interests, an overly compliant media. A massive state apparatus is obviously needed to integrate and advance those many global commitments and operations of the most far-reaching imperial power in history. It follows that the elite stratum Mills investigated during the 1950s was bound to exhibit greater authoritarian tendencies over time, facilitated by the waging of several wars, maintenance of a huge war economy and security state, and increasing pursuit of neoliberal globalization. What might be called “backlash politics” – negative conservative reaction to epochal social movements of the 1960s and 1970s – seems to have further emboldened fascistic impulses over the past three decades. The “military-industrial complex” that President Dwight Eisenhower famously denounced in 1961 was then, and remains today, the cornerstone of an authoritarian state that flourishes behind a liberal-democratic facade. Whether “liberal” or “conservative”, Democratic or Republican, American-style state-capitalism is now a defining element of the political culture, just as super-patriotism remains endemic to imperial legitimation.<sup>10</sup>

These historical forces, identified by Mills and by later critics (Chris Hedges, Sheldon Wolin, Chalmers Johnson, Henry Giroux), have deepened from the 1990s into the new century. Those forces extend far beyond any particular White-House occupant, though Reagan, the two Bushes, and Bill Clinton all made ample contributions. By the second Bush presidency, ostensibly dedicated to “small government” and “free markets”, U.S. military spending had surpassed that of the next eight nations *combined*, yet another tribute to a self-sustaining warfare system. By 2016, with Obama in power for seven years, Pentagon spending all-told was nearing one trillion dollars when spending for veterans is taken into account.

It would be mistaken to view the second Bush presidency as the single or even main catalyst behind militarized state-capitalism, as that trajectory was set in motion decades earlier. Still Bush, with the help of warmongering Republicans, neocons, and Democratic allies, took this system to new levels, underpinned by American exceptionalism and continued pursuit of global domination. During Bush’s militaristic reign (2000 to 2008), U.S. government and armed-forces budgets – along with national debt – soared to all-time records even as the White House and its supporters continued to rant against the evils of state power. Bush was of course architect of the catastrophic Iraq War, an illegal, costly, and savage intervention that would forever transform Middle Eastern politics, generating extreme blowback in the form of rising insurgent and terrorist groups. Under Bush, and with onset of a global War on Terrorism, the groundwork had been laid for vast augmentations of state and military power, new imperial ventures, broadened surveillance, curtailment of civil liberties, and revival of an already-swollen prison complex.

In fact the Bush presidency, ruinous as it was, introduced little that was novel to U.S. foreign policy, its *modus operandi* adopted largely from previous stages of American history. Thus the duplicitous case for “preemptive war” in 2003 had

many precursors: Polk in Mexico, McKinley in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Cuba, Wilson in Central America and Mexico, the postwar Truman Doctrine, Kennedy in Cuba, Johnson in Indochina, the first Bush in Panama, and more recently Clinton in the Balkans.<sup>11</sup> None of these presidents exhibited much regard for Constitutional restraints – nor for the sovereignty of other nations. Bush’s war might have been particularly horrendous in its consequences, but historical precedents abound. Bush and the neocons who shaped his foreign policy carried forward practices that, in any event, were mostly a function of historical *processes* rather than any sudden introduction of illicit “methods” by an evil dictator. If something resembling a fascist shift is at work in American society, we are clearly dealing with more than a few bad leaders and their stupid decisions.

If an American fascism or its “equivalent” is indeed on the horizon, as I suggest, a thorough analysis of longstanding social and political conditions favorable to its realization is in order, yet most writers on this topic offer nothing of the sort. In the first place, the extreme Nazi example turns out to be entirely worthless for the task, as historical trends in the U.S. are highly unlikely to produce a Hitler, tyrannical dictatorship, death camps, or holocaust. A further problem: could fascism, then or now, plausibly be framed as a set of leadership schemes to conquer power and hoodwink the masses? Could Bush, Cheney, and the neocons – or their authoritarian heirs – have imagined a fascist takeover by emulating the path of Hitler and Goebbels? The question, of course, contains its own answer: any fascist shift in a highly-industrialized country like the U.S. (indeed *any* country) is today unthinkable apart from a lengthy process of social and political transformation.

This logic was emphatically true even for most cases of classical fascism, which defied the “revolutionary overthrow” scenario adopted by many (especially American) scholars. In such diverse settings as Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain fascism came to power through a coalition of social forces, typically including big business and the military, usually allied with traditional interests (big landholders, the Church, monarchy), winning popular support through multiclass appeals to nationalism and pre-industrial values. The social groups, political alliances, and historical conditions crucial to the ascendancy of fascist regimes after World War I never appeared suddenly or unexpectedly, as in a revolution or putsch – the narrative often mistakenly advanced for the U.S.

Our exploration of fascist tendencies under conditions of modern state-capitalism is best advanced when abundant myths associated with historical fascism are discredited. Three such myths have been identified – Nazi Germany as archetype, the “totalitarian” specter, the revolutionary overthrow scenario. Others might be added: predominance of atheistic ideology, heavy reliance on paramilitary squads, exclusive regime dependency on terroristic violence, a developmental trajectory rooted in romantic, backward, anti-Enlightenment appeals. Such distorted views of interwar fascism will be more fully discussed – and debunked – in the following chapters.

For fascism or its “equivalent” to take root in the U.S., liberal-democratic politics would have to be mostly stripped of its content; authoritarian structures

and practices would have to crowd out popular governance, a process actually long underway. In his seminal *Democracy, Inc.* (2007), Wolin, following in the tracks of Mills, argues that American democracy has deteriorated in an era of widening corporate, state, and bureaucratic power today further reinforced by globalization and imperial pursuits.<sup>12</sup> The future hardly merits optimism, as extreme wealth colonizes more and more of the political terrain. Wolin reluctantly concludes that “One cannot point to any national institutions that [today] can be accurately described as democratic ...”<sup>13</sup> Congress, the presidency, court system, parties, state agencies, workplaces, schools and universities, and of course the military – all these arenas of public life are controlled by a combination of wealthy and bureaucratic interests, remain uniformly hierarchical, and lack vigorous citizen participation.

A key turning-point for Wolin was an enlarged “power imaginary” that surfaced during and after World War II.<sup>14</sup> War mobilization, superpower ambitions, nuclear politics, the security state, and permanent war economy all served to extend the boundaries of power, eroding Constitutional limits while feeding into statist, corporate, and imperial authoritarianism – the very stuff of historical fascism. Under such conditions the classical liberalism of free markets, small government, and local autonomy was losing much of its efficacy, even as opinion-leaders ritually celebrated those same ideals. The new “power imaginary” further coincided with the spread of large-scale organization, rapid global expansion, Cold War ideological consensus, and a narrowing elite culture. As Wolin notes, however, the truly novel aspect of this (proto-fascist?) shift was its ever-broadening *scope*, for the U.S. had from its earliest days been an oligarchical, colonial, interventionist nation propelled by an exceptionalist ideology.<sup>15</sup>

In *Democracy, Inc.* Wolin fixes his attention on a political behemoth even more authoritarian and frightening than what Mills had so graphically described. Like Mills, Wolin identifies a crucial dialectic that organically links superpower politics and concentrated domestic power – a dialectic strengthened after 9/11 and the mounting cycle of militarism and terrorism, intervention and blowback that pushed the warfare state to new heights. Constraints on U.S. power have steadily diminished as the War on Terrorism perpetually legitimates the imperial state, cloaking its naked drive for economic and geopolitical advantage behind the wounded innocence of avenging victim, as in the case of Germany following its World War I defeat and then added humiliation at Versailles. The specter of a vengeful superpower facing off against barbaric enemies on a world scale conjures a Hobbesian state of nature in which the threat of anarchy or chaos must be countered by an order-giving, protective, all-powerful Leviathan.

If American society does eventually transition into a new type of fascism – as suggested here – the explanation lies in the further maturation of *existing* historical trends. The structures and norms of liberal-democracy were long ago severely compromised by the weight of corporate interests, massive state and bureaucratic power, and a bloated warfare state. As a theory of democratic governance, ritually

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championed by U.S. politicians and the media, classical liberalism has seen its better day, while modern forms of (corporate-state) liberalism are increasingly bankrupt as a source of citizen participation and popular decision-making. This very trajectory was anticipated decades ago by theorists of the Frankfurt School, who argued that advanced industrial society was gradually transitioning into a totally-administered order – not against but entirely *within* liberal democracy – an order inimical to critical thought, social autonomy, and oppositional politics.

One of those theorists, Herbert Marcuse, revisited this approach in *One Dimensional Man* (1964), which set forth a quasi-Orwellian view of modernity. He wrote:

By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For “totalitarian” is not only a terroristic political coordination of society, but also a non-terroristic economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests. It thus precludes the emergence of an effective opposition against the whole.<sup>16</sup>

For Marcuse, this new reality was both *structural* and *ideological*: one-dimensionality, like economic rationalization, was endemic to the modern capitalist economy, including its political supports and legitimating beliefs. Elsewhere Marcuse suggested that fascism could evolve out of “highly-organized capitalism” (state-capitalism) and its rationalized new order, arguing that “the idea of dictatorship and of the authoritarian direction of the state is not at all foreign to liberalism.”<sup>17</sup>

For historical fascism, despite its well-known hostility to liberalism and exaltation of dictatorial power, we know that everywhere those regimes, over time, represented the oligarchical and authoritarian face of the capitalist economic system. Wolin concludes that, to the degree formal attributes of liberal democracy in the U.S. remain in place – elections, party competition, legislatures, interest groups, etc. – they have sharply diminished resonance where “opposition has not been liquidated but rendered feckless”, where “extreme views (outside the mainstream) are routinely filtered out and neutralized.”<sup>18</sup> Here resistance to authoritarian state-capitalism is check-mated more by well-managed ideological consensus than by state coercion or heavy-handed propaganda that, in any case, is nowadays likely to be counter-productive. Thus Rupert Murdoch and his media empire (including FOX television news) turns out to be far more efficacious than the clumsy (and more narrow) efforts of Josef Goebbels and his Nazi propaganda machine. Antonio Gramsci’s concept of ideological hegemony – consistent with Marcuse’s one-dimensionality – seems more relevant to contemporary American society than to earlier variants of fascism, which did rely on heavy-handed state propaganda.

Standard views of fascism are distorted not only because of their crude, mechanistic, ahistorical understanding of the interwar phenomenon (itself rather

diverse), but also by failure to adequately theorize modern-day American power relations. In fact the challenge of making conceptual sense of political life in the U.S. remains as daunting as ever. For one thing, many observers are still trapped in formulaic, outmoded discourses, in which “democracy” is reduced to a form of ritualized discourse without clear referents. On the other hand, familiar talk of “state-monopoly capitalism”, “welfare-state capitalism”, and so forth offers few insights during the first decades of the twenty-first century, while the numerous prefixes to “democracy” – elitist, pluralist, capitalist, polyarchic, etc. – similarly fall short, despite some truth content. Certain labels fail to rise above casual sloganeering: thus facile talk of “plutocracy” captures a kernel of validity in describing American society, but in the end says little concretely about ideology, politics, and foreign policy.

Probing further, my contention is that neither “democracy” nor “totalitarianism” adequately describes contemporary American politics in any meaningful sense – a view explored in the first three chapters of this book. Both concepts, in different ways, owe much to Cold War ideology that framed East and West in stark but overdrawn opposition. Can the authoritarian politics so aptly described by Mills and Wolin be fairly understood as “democratic” or “liberal-democratic” in an era of militarized state-capitalism? Wolin’s resort to the term “managed democracy”, moreover, appears rather contradictory on its face, as Wolin himself concedes at one point. At the other extreme, how useful today is the “totalitarian” model historically associated with the regimes of Hitler and Stalin, with their massive state terrorism, gulags, crude state propaganda, holocaust, and monolithic single-party rule? If fascism comes to the U.S., it will look rather different from this earlier historical experience – though ideological parallels are nowadays more visible than Americans are prepared to entertain.

Efforts to theorize power relations in the U.S. become all the more challenging when the very uniqueness of American historical development is taken into account: its broad trajectory is best understood as *sui generis*, lacking precedent or easy comparison. The U.S. is the most economically, politically, and militarily powerful nation in world history, emboldened by a morally-righteous legacy of exceptionalism, its superpower ambitions sustained by ongoing need for mortal enemies. (Familiar talk of U.S. “imperial decline”, even if valid, hardly applies to the stubborn reality of *military* supremacy, which the ruling elites can never voluntarily abandon.) This is a country, with its long history of imperial ventures, that has routinely and devastatingly intervened across the world for more than a century. Yet the U.S. is also a nation that for much of its history has embraced liberal democracy and human rights, however partial and compromised by colonialism, racism, poverty, and unfettered corporate power.

It is often forgotten that earlier fascism tended to follow multiple paths – one reason the extreme Nazi model can be very misleading. Nowadays, of course, the durability of liberal democracy in the West and elsewhere clouds the issue, especially for those convinced that particular order could never coexist with some



newer variant of fascism. Recent writers on this topic – Michael Mann, Walter Laqueur, and Robert Paxton among them – have an understandably jaundiced view about the possibility of modern-day fascism.<sup>19</sup> According to Mann, the ideology was always largely European, one long ago “defeated, dead, and buried.”<sup>20</sup> With its overwhelmingly negative stigma, fascism nowadays appeals to no one beyond a few crackpots and thugs. The institutionalization of liberal democracy in Europe and North America, moreover, has neutralized the totalizing (also partially pre-modern) thrust of fascist ideology. Laqueur agrees, stressing that fascism can never survive under conditions of modernity given its outmoded single-party monopoly, reliance on state terrorism, virulent nationalism, and close alliance with elements of the old (now mostly vanished) social order. Any fascist tendencies that surface here and there are destined to remain localized, dispersed, and mired in futility.<sup>21</sup>

These and kindred arguments regarding the current “impossibility” of fascism are highly problematic for several reasons, which I lay out in the following chapters. To begin, most images of historical fascism are either vastly overdrawn or given to caricature. Reliance on the hardly typical Nazi model only obscures understanding of trends at work – and how they might gather strength over time. It is mistaken to believe that in the absence of a maniacal dictator, single-party monopoly, crude state propaganda, a network of concentration camps, and genocidal savagery there could be absolutely no possibility of “fascism”. History is unlikely to duplicate those properties of earlier fascist systems. Further, if the persistence of liberal democracy complicates matters, one might still concede that crucial *ideological* parallels between classical fascism and the present conjuncture are much too evident to ignore. Here the “palingenetic” features linking ultra-nationalism, militarism, and imperialism that Roger Griffin placed at the core of historical fascism, when viewed alongside expanding corporate power, recall much (though obviously not all) of interwar fascist ideology.<sup>22</sup>

Griffin’s penetrating analysis of interwar fascism – centered appropriately on the Italian model – seems increasingly relevant to the American setting, always taking into account clear historical differences. Focusing on the “palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism” that swept Europe in the years following World War I, he identifies a “fascist minimum” applicable to diverse geographical settings in which the movements, parties, and regimes succeeded.<sup>23</sup> This was the locus of a dynamic ideological syndrome, especially decisive at moments of crisis, that promised national regeneration, a “new start” in a world riddled with corruption, decay, and imminent threats. Such “threats” usually appeared in the form of leftist (Socialist, Communist, anarchist) upsurges that swept Europe during the 1920s and 1930s in the wake of the Russian Revolution. In Griffin’s view, fascism tapped into extreme nationalism as unifying ideology, where patriotic rebirth signaled a turning-point in history when, finally, the masses could feel empowered within a solidifying community. Here fascist leaders became especially adept at manipulating a popular yearning for grand achievements and national identity. In

the case of Mussolini's Italy, the goal of a new Roman Empire was placed on the political agenda, promising unification where before there had been division, fragmentation, and alienation resulting in part from an incomplete *Risorgimento* (bourgeois-national revolution) going back to the 1860s and 1870s.

To achieve its rightful place in history, fascism required large-scale political direction: state planning, merger of corporate and governmental power, a strong military, armed interventions, mass mobilization. Crucially, this meant a *strengthening* rather than transcendence of capitalism. Following the classical pattern, a modern "fascist equivalent" could be expected to achieve power on the basis of historically-embedded tendencies that, in the U.S., would be broadly consistent with the militarized state-capitalism described by Mills and Wolin. The palingenetic motif introduced by Griffin has in fact been part of the American landscape for several decades, fueled by the "Vietnam Syndrome" and motifs surrounding 9/11: national exceptionalism, religious messianism, corporatism, militarism, imperialism. As for palingenetic ultra-nationalism, the post-9/11 milieu with the resultant War on Terrorism has been ideologically congenial to the flourishing of such attitudes in the U.S. If these historical trends appear (however uneasily) compatible with a (declining) liberal tradition and pluralist norms, it is worth mentioning that this was at least partially true for interwar fascism, where the degree of "totalitarian" controls has always been wildly exaggerated.

In contrast to views commonly set forth regarding classical fascism, therefore, the idea that such movements, parties, and regimes constituted a "political revolution" seems rather overdrawn. This logic applies all the more to American society today, partly because it exaggerates the U.S. democratic legacy, partly because any fascist shift will be more a culmination of prevailing historical forces and economic interests than the result of diabolical elite schemes or total break with the past. As Bertram Gross presciently argued in *Friendly Fascism* (1982), a distinctly American fascism is destined to be of a more "friendly" type, without major social disruptions, systematic terrorism, paramilitary actions, Mussolini-style demagoguery, or outright attacks on the Constitution.<sup>24</sup> If these classical fascist methods are never likely to succeed within existing American political culture, neither would any of them likely be *necessary*.

Any future American fascism would surely depart radically from the historical experience, again itself extraordinarily diverse with the Nazi example (contrary to myth) more exceptional than typical. After all, Nazi Germany was the only regime marked by Hitlerian leadership and genocidal policies. It follows that facile comparisons between interwar fascism and American conditions today would be inevitably misguided. As Gross pointed out, right-wing authoritarian elites are now far less likely to embrace *Freikorps*-style militias, the *Führerprinzip*, and death camps, preferring instead a *modus operandi* more or less compatible with an advanced state-capitalism.

Leaving aside the Nazi exception, the very expanse of American power today – corporate, state, military, global – ought to starkly pose the question of a

potential “fascist equivalent” or beyond. (A preference for relying primarily on the Italian model of fascism – essentially a heuristic move – should not be interpreted as diminishing the German Nazi experience and its unprecedented militarism and genocidal policies toward Jews and others. On the contrary, the view here is that the Nazi legacy is so extreme and barbaric that it is not likely to be replicated. There is the further danger of downplaying fascistic tendencies in the U.S. or elsewhere simply because they fall short of the Hitlerian nightmare.)

Such “fascist equivalent” would inevitably be less “totalitarian” than classical fascist systems that, in any event, typically depended on traditional pillars of support (Church, monarchy, aristocracy) which enjoyed considerable social and political autonomy. Further, we know that elements of liberalism and right-wing authoritarianism can readily coexist, as they have historically in countries like Japan, Mexico, Turkey, Russia, and South Korea – most of these relatively advanced capitalist nations. The very notion of an earlier fascist “revolution”, leading to total rupture with the past, turns out to be another time-honored fiction.

Fixation on paramilitary action rooted in the phenomenon of fascist militias, as in the famous but essentially mythical “march on Rome”, has been overdrawn even for best-case Italy. In reality powerful elite coalitions largely dictated the parameters of fascist ascendancy, and most paramilitary groups were either weak or inert; mass political activity largely occurred within a transmission belt flowing from top to bottom. As Laqueur correctly points out: “True, the masses were ‘mobilized’, not in order to participate actively in politics, not to fight in the streets, but to march in occasional mass demonstrations and parades, to listen from time to time to lectures, and to attend similar functions.”<sup>25</sup>

For Japanese fascism, Barrington Moore pointed to a similar conclusion: the regime was based on an alliance of big business and traditional interests, where elites rallied the masses around nationalism and militarism while orchestrating everything from above.<sup>26</sup> The Japanese model, though rarely discussed, was in fact closer to the general pattern than was Nazi Germany. It might be the case that a depoliticized public sphere could exist alongside strong fascist currents in the U.S., endowing the power elite with maximum flexibility. For modern authoritarian rule, popular insurgency ends up more disruptive than system-sustaining.

For the U.S. in the early twenty-first century, there is one exception to this political maxim – a reactionary populism that has gained strength since the 1990s, associated with a variety of social forces: local militias, Christian fundamentalism, and the Tea Party among them. Trump’s presidency apparently lent new legitimacy to the evangelical movement, especially with the selection of Mike Pence as vice-president and Betsy DeVos as Secretary of Education. As American society moves ever rightward, evangelicals have grown in numbers, organizations, media presence, and general influence. They work indefatigably through state legislatures, PACs, think tanks, conferences, and media outlets to carry out “God’s work”, hoping to Christianize secular institutions, beginning with education, bringing “family values” and patriotism to the forefront. Evangelical constituencies were large

enough to have provided Trump with at least 35 percent of his vote in 2016. Their “populism” is driven by a rather cohesive ideology that could help solidify a social bloc behind fascistic tendencies, as was the case for classical fascism.

The possibility of a fully-developed fascist order in the U.S. still appears rather murky, especially when definitions of fascism cling blindly to the classical model – or caricatures of that model. Whether Constitutional and other liberal restraints can impede such an outcome in the face of expanding corporate, state, and military power, however, is problematic. The election of a Democrat to the presidency may not suffice to arrest this trajectory, as Democrats are beholden to the same ruling interests – and subscribe to roughly the same ideological outlook – as Republicans. As we have seen with the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democrats have in fact come to relish their status as War Party, ramping up a desire for confrontation with Russia and regime change in Syria, perhaps elsewhere. Counter-forces to oligarchy, authoritarianism, and war naturally exist, including social movements, grassroots activism, third parties, and street mobilizations like those following Trump’s electoral victory. All of these, in one form or another, have surfaced and resurfaced throughout American history, but social movements and third parties have typically been small, marginalized, and devoid of longevity (leaving aside modern feminism and environmentalism).

Within the established political arrangements, democratic processes and norms (still visible on the surface) have lost vitality with each passing year. Signs of a vigorous democratic politics – widespread and dynamic participation, institutional accountability, broad access, issue knowledge and awareness, sense of political efficacy – have sharply declined in recent decades, interrupted at least momentarily by the historic Bernie Sanders 2016 primary campaign that was cynically blocked by the Democratic establishment. Narrowing of the media oligopoly has been checked somewhat by the rapidly-expanding Internet and social media. If the U.S. is indeed on the road to a more full-blown authoritarian and oligarchical order – perhaps accelerated by the Trump presidency – whether that order is overtly fascist or constitutes some equally dangerous “equivalent”, the accumulated institutional and ideological barriers might be far weaker than Americans who reside outside the summits of power are ready to acknowledge.

## Notes

- 1 Aldous Huxley, *Brave New World Revisited* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), p. 7.
- 2 C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
- 3 See Thomas Frank, *The Wrecking Crew: How Conservatives Rule* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2008).
- 4 Thomas Frank, *What’s the Matter with Kansas?* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2005).
- 5 See Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press), pp. 495–96.
- 6 Mills, *Power Elite*, p. 23.
- 7 Carl Boggs, *Origins of the Warfare State* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

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- 8 Mills, *Power Elite*, p. 212.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 275.
- 10 See Carl Boggs, *Imperial Delusions* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), ch. 4.
- 11 For an excellent overview of the history of U.S. foreign interventions, see William Blum, *Killing Hope* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995).
- 12 Sheldon Wolin, *Democracy, Inc.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 105.
- 14 *Ibid.*, ch. 2.
- 15 *Ibid.*, ch. 5.
- 16 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 3.
- 17 Herbert Marcuse, *Negations* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 9.
- 18 Wolin, *Democracy, Inc.*, p. 141.
- 19 See Michael Mann, *Fascists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Walter Laqueur, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).
- 20 Mann, *Fascists*, p. 370.
- 21 Laqueur, *Fascism*, pp. 224–25.
- 22 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1991), ch. 1.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 24 Bertram Gross, *Friendly Fascism* (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1982).
- 25 Laqueur, *Fascism*, p. 36.
- 26 Moore, *Social Origins*, p. 385.